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Abstract 
Traditional protest behaviours are motivated by social influences (e.g., Finkel & Opp, 1991), 
whereby individual differences moderate this effect (Bäck, Bäck, & Garcia-Albacete, 2013). With 
this experiment it is tested whether the same pathways apply to online activism. For this between-
subject design, 75 young to middle-aged adults were tested on the traits of need to belong and 
rejection sensitivity. Following the exposure to either low (n = 34) or high (n = 41) social 
support, participants reacted upon petition appeals on a social network site. It was found that high 
social support enhanced the willingness to participate in online activism. However, rejection 
sensitivity in moderation of social support did not influence willingness to engage in online 
activism, whereas need to belong in moderation of social support affected willingness to engage 
in online activism. Implications of these findings are set in context, and future research 
possibilities are discussed. 
   Keywords: social incentives, rejection sensitivity, need to belong, online-activism, protest        
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How Social Influences and Individual Differences Affect Online-Activism  
Many social interactions and political behaviours, such as political activism, take place online. As 
social influences and personality traits motivate conventional, that is ‚‘offline‘ protest, it is now 
investigated whether similar patterns apply to online activism.  
Social and Political Behaviours on the Internet  
 People commonly use the Internet, and have made it an important medium to interact          
socially, as well as to engage politically. Social media, defined as media on which participants 
can interact. About half of the German Internet users visit social network sites (SNSs; 
Statistisches Bundesamt, 2013). SNSs are websites on which users can interactively form their 
social connections online. It was found that users spent much time on SNSs interacting with their 
offline social circles (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2013; Lampe, Ellison, & Steinfield, 2006), and 
likeminded people (Kaye, 2011; Bimber, 2008), whereby younger individuals are more engaged 
in this form of communication, but older individuals are becoming more active, too (Hampton, 
Goulet, Rainie, & Purcell, 2011). In this way, users cultivate and extend their social ties 
throughout the network (Zhang, Johnson, Seltzer, & Bichard, 2010). Furthermore, a majority of 
users receive political information from online sources such as online newspapers, magazines and 
news sites (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2013), and many users visit interactive sites on which they, 
for instance, express their political views, receive and share political information, engage in 
political discussions, vote and protest (Kaye, 2011; Statistisches Bundesamt, 2013). Nowadays, 
social media, and in particular SNSs, provide platforms for numerous protest behaviours. Users 
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frequently receive and share political and protest related content (Vitak et al., 2011; Varnali & 
Gorgulu, 2015), voice their ideas, and globally as well as locally affiliate with like-minded people 
(Marichal, 2013). Collectively, users appeal for social and political change by means of, inter 
alia, online petitions (Christensen, 2011), and online campaigns (Penney, 2014). On SNSs people 
distribute and discuss political information, for example on their network’s newsfeeds . 1
Moreover, international and national participation rates are predicted to increase further (Rainie, 
Smith, Schlozman, Brady, & Verba, 2012; Statistisches Bundesamt, 2013). Hence, social, 
political and explicitly protest related uses of the Internet are already common and likely to 
further increase. With this study, it is asked whether online activism is motivated by the same 
mechanisms of social influences as conventional protests. First, the theoretical bases of 
conventional protest participation is clarified.  
Theoretical Framework of Protest Participation  
 When it is asked what motivates people to protest, the first thing that comes into mind may          
be political and social change. Here, it may be argued that the individual has a rational choice 
whether to partake in protest. This behaviour can be defined in an equation, which had been first 
proposed for voter turnout (Olson, 1965), then Muller and Opp (1986) applied it to protest 
engagement. It reads    
 For clarification: a newsfeed is an individual page within each user’s account that shows 1
chronologically what the user’s connections have published on their profile pages in form of 
status updates. A profile page is a personalised online page on which each user can publish 
thoughts, links, photos and videos, etc., which then are publicly, or semi-publicly, shared, mostly 
with the user’s connections and often with the broader public (Lampe et al., 2006). Those 
publications are called status updates. Status updates in turn are fed to the newsfeeds of the 
publisher’s connections. 
Running head: SOCIAL INFLUENCES IN ONLINE PROTEST                                              !5
 U = P x B – C          
where U is the utility of protest, B from the benefit that derives from a successful protest, P is the  
probability that a single individual will evoke this success, and C is defined as the costs that the 
individuals experiences when she partakes in protest. An individual chooses to protest if the 
benefits of successful protest based on their individual engagement exceed her costs, or, 
expressed in mathematical terms:  
 P x B > C          
Olson’s (1965) reasoned on voting behaviour, but this equation is applicable to much collective 
political activity in general (Bäck et al., 2011). It can be said that many political actions are 
conducted by a politically active group of people. If the action undertaken is successful, not only 
the politically active group members, but a greater amount of beneficiaries or even an entire 
society may profit from this outcome. Yet, for collective political action, an individuals’ single 
contribution to a political activity is very small, because the likelihood that this single 
individual’s contribution adds decisively towards a successful outcome is small (Olson, 1965). 
Given the small impact that one individual within one collective movement makes, the costs for 
the political engagement oftentimes overrides the possible benefits of the individual. It follows 
that free-riding on others’ efforts would be rational (Klandermans, & van Stekelenburg, 2013). 
When people politically engage nevertheless, their participation is paradoxical (Olson, 1965).  
Collective and Selective Incentives Models 
 To solve this paradox, Bäck, Teorell, and Westholm (2011) proposed two solutions: First,          
the collective incentives model, which suggests that some citizens believe they have the efficacy 
Running head: SOCIAL INFLUENCES IN ONLINE PROTEST                                              !6
to influence political outcomes and therefore protest. The equation remains the same  
 U = P x B – C          
but according to this model the outcome of the product P x B, that is higher perceived efficacy, 
will yield U > 0, where the utility is believed to be positive, and consequently the individual 
engages in protest. Second, the selective incentives model which states that the individual, 
independently of the collective outcome, derives benefits from protest (Bäck et al., 2013). The 
previous equation (Olson, 1965) ought to be incomplete, and ought to be extended with D ,  2
 U = P x B – C + D          
where D is the reward that protesters gain by participation in protest itself (Bäck et al., 2011). The 
reward derives from selective incentives, which are defined as social norm (e.g., Olson, 1965), 
strength of party identification (e.g., Finkel & Opp, 1991), expressive incentives, that is the 
satisfaction from expressing one’s opinion (Riker & Ordeshook, 1968), and entertainment value, 
defined as enjoying the company of others (Tullock, 1971). For instance, participation itself is 
motivated by social norm that either is imposed by the individual herself, or by others. Social 
norm, which also is called social normative influence at times (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955), can 
exert social pressure on the individual, therefore people comply to and conform with what is 
expected of them (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). For the sake of the following argumentation, I 
would like to point out that incentives may not only have a positive valence as suggested by the 
wording, incentive, that is motivate people to act, but may also have negative valence, that is 
hinder people from, for instance, protesting. A explicit negative social norm against a protest 
behaviour may impede protest engagement (Finkel & Opp, 1991). It is reasoned that a lack for 
originally reward of voting independent of the election (Riker & Ordeshook, 1968)2
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social norm on a topic, that is a neutral stand of the in-group, may dampen protest engagement, 
too, because it can signalise that the group does not value the topic. Moreover, I would like to 
remind the reader that essential all aforementioned selective incentives are social in nature, 
because they are defined by the interplay between the individual and an–in a broadest sense–an 
in-group, such as the individual is influenced by the norm defining in-groups in case of social 
norm, and the political party in case of party identification. The individual derives gratification 
from expressive incentives. According to the optimal distinctiveness theory (Brewer, 1991), the 
individual aims for the optimal equilibrium between being included in and distinguished from 
both, her in-group(s) and her out-group(s). The individual can optimally balance between 
inclusion and distinctiveness by the expression of, for instance, her opinion, hence expressive 
incentives are of psycho-social importance for the individual. Last, the individual experiences 
gratification by the company of others, or in other words, she experiences interpersonal and intra-
group connectedness. It can thus be said that essentially, selective incentives are rooted in social 
needs of the individual in relation to others (Maslow, 1943).  
Extension of the selective incentives model.  
 In the following, it will be argued that not only the established selective incentives of the          
selective incentive model may be valuable in the explanation of online protest activity, but also 
other social influences may affect protest engagement. Selective incentives, as stated by the 
model, are rewarding the individual with intra-group and inter-group gratification, whereas I 
propose that social influences in a broader sense not only fulfil these reward functions, but also 
facilitate the step towards protest engagement, that means they hold meaning in the process of 
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making the choice. In other words, in case of social influences, social fulfilment and 
connectedness is the bases on which protest evolves, whereas social incentives reward social 
fulfilment if the protest has been performed. Inside the given equation, those social influences are 
hence not defined in rewards D, but are framed as part of the term C, namely as influences that 
may lower or raise the costs C of protest engagement, or may contribute to the term P, the 
probability that a single individual will evoke success of the protest. I argue that C as well as P 
are not static, in case of C, for example informational social influence this is “influence to accept 
information from another as evidence about reality“ (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955, p. 629) facilitates 
information flow and hereby lowers the cost of participation. The latter term, P may fluctuate 
depending on how strong the basis of the protest already is, up to the point where an individual’s 
contribution does not at all matter anymore to the protest, because the success is already secured 
by participant numbers and their engagement. P for instance, is influenced by instrumental social 
support, which is defined as other group members that also are willing to take action or are taking 
action (van Zomeren et al., 2004), by doing so, the probability that the individual will 
successfully contribute to the protest rise, because it raises efficacy of the movement. In addition, 
protesters personally profit from social influences, because these influences, in one way or the 
other, strengthen the connections between the individual and the group. Thus, commonly, 
selective incentives as well as other social influences are social in nature, and are rooted in 
interplay of the self, the in-group and at times the out-group.  
 The individual behaves in ways that enables her to gain connectedness to and acceptance of          
others, as well as to avoid loss as she prevents herself from being rejected. According to the 
belongingness hypothesis, humans need ‘’to form and maintain […] interpersonal 
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relationships” (Baumeister & Leary, 1995, p. 499). Furthermore, people are sensitive to rejection 
cues in order to not be rejected (Williams, 2007). Lastly, for each individual these social needs 
are differently strong (e.g., Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Downey & Feldman, 1996). These 
theoretical bases in mind, it is focussed on empirical findings concerning social incentives and 
other social influences, which in the following are summarised to social influences, in 
conventional protest.  
Prevalence of Social Influences on Protest 
 In the context of protest engagement, social influences, such as instrumental social support,          
that is other’s willingness to engage in protest actions (van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 
2004), and social network incentives, these are the expectations of others, group encouragement 
and meeting people accounted for form and extent of legal and illegal protest behaviours (Finkel, 
Muller, & Opp, 1989; Finkel & Opp, 1991). Compliance with social norms motivated people to 
protest, and to contact officials (Bäck, et al. 2011). Conclusively, social influences motivate hu-
mans to engage in various form of conventional protest. Next it will be argued, why online 
protest may be socially influenced, too.  
Social Influences in Online Activism 
 The circles on SNSs are perceived as person’s in-groups, as such social influences are          
prevalent (Lampe et al. 2006). Indeed, current findings suggests that social influences spur online 
activism: networks on which political engagement was displayed were predictive of users’ online 
and conventional political engagement (Vitak et al., 2011). In addition, self-chosen circles, and 
Running head: SOCIAL INFLUENCES IN ONLINE PROTEST                                              !10
especially close connections, have encouraged users to vote (Bond et al., 2012), and to protest 
(Gibson & McAllister, 2013). Hence, social influences that promote protest are found on SNSs, 
but seemingly no research investigated individual differences in susceptibility, unlike in conven-
tional protest behaviour.  
Individual Differences in Suggestibility to Social Influences 
 Individuals differ in their need to belong (Leary et al., 2013)  and rejection sensitivity          
(Downey & Feldman, 1996). A study on interpersonal differences of rejection sensitivity, as well 
as on the influence of social support, explored the willingness to protest against the introduction 
of tuition fees in Sweden. The results suggest that rejection sensitive participants were more will-
ing to protest collectively through political involvement and organisation meetings if social sup-
port was high, but not if social support was low (Bäck et al., 2013).  
 So far it has been established that various human behaviours, including protest activities,          
are influenced by social incentives to individually varying degrees. As the offline world has been 
extending into the online sphere, protest consequently has become common in the online space, it 
ought to be asked whether–and if so, to what extent–the same social influences will similarly mo-
tivate people to engage in online activism.  
Hypotheses 
 This study explores whether social influences, in this case, the influence of social support,          
enhance the willingness to engage in online protest behaviours, and whether this effect is moder-
ated by individual differences in rejection sensitivity and need to belong. 
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 First, aiming to replicate previously findings on social influences in protest activity, it is          
expected that the amount of the in-group's engagement influences the participant’s the overall 
willingness to participate in online protest behaviours. The first hypothesis reads accordingly: 
social support positively effects the willingness to online activism. More specifically, if the in-
group supports the cause, the individual indicates willingness to engage, too and vice versa, if the 
in-group is disengaged, the individual is less willing to engage.  
 Previous research on conventional protest behaviour suggests that individual differences in          
rejection sensitivity moderate the impact of social support on political activism (Bäck et al., 
2013). In an attempt to expand previous findings to online-activism, it is assumed that rejection 
sensitive people engage in online protest out of the fear of rejection. Hence, the second hypothe-
sis states that if an individual's in-group promotes online protest, rejection sensitive people are 
more likely to take part in the protest. Conversely, if the in-group does not promote protest, rejec-
tion sensitive individuals are also less willing to engage in online activism. 
 Rejection sensitivity and need to belong represent two, conceptually different constructs          
(Leary et al., 2013) but both have been found to predict suggestibility to social influences (e.g., 
Bäck et al., 2013; Nolan, Schultz, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2008). For example, a 
great need for belong was associated with ample cooperation in social dilemmas (De Cremer & 
Leonardelli, 2003). However, individual differences in the need to belong have not been, to the 
knowledge of the author, explicitly tested on political activities. Given evidence from the social 
dilemma study, it is induced that the need to belong can moderate the impact of social influences 
on online protest. It follows the third hypothesis, which states that if many in-group members 
promote protest: persons, who score highly on the need to belong, are more willing to engage in 
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online protest behaviour; on the other hand, if the in-group does not promote online activism, in-
dividuals high in the need to belong are less inclined to participate, neither.  
Method  
Participants 
 The sample consisted of 75 German speaking participants  (42 female). They were between          3
19 and 54 years old (MAge = 28.67, SD = 8.48), and came from various educational levels and oc-
cupational backgrounds. Based on convenience sampling, participants were recruited via Face-
book on profile pages and in groups, where they opted-in to answer this online survey. In ex-
change for the respondents' participation, they could choose to partake in a raffle for cinema tick-
ets worth 20 Euros. 
Materials 
 It was chosen to use petition appeals as experimental stimuli, because this form or similar          
forms of online activism are well known and employed by users, whereby in Germany roughly 
every fourth SNS user engaged in petition signing or comparable behaviours (Statistisches Bun-
desamt, 2013), whereas in the USA, participation was even higher, that is, ever third SNS-user 
 The sample size follows a conservative estimate of  N ≥ 50 + 8m (m = IVs) (Tabachnick & 3
Fidell, 2013). Five independent variables (three main-effects and two 2-way interactions) are 
used, which accumulates an aspired sample size of 90 participants. This is the actual, analysed 
sample. The total sample size incl. dropouts and outliers are presented in Result section. 
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engaged in petition signing or comparable actions (Rainie et al., 2012). Petition appeals not only 
inform readers about political and deficiencies, but also animate readers to react to them in form 
of liking, sharing or signing the petitions. As part of this survey, a fictitious Facebook newsfeed 
for the unisex identity ‘Kim Oosterhagen' was created using genuine Facebook publications, 
which were modified with the image editing software Adobe PhotoshopTM and the Fake Name 
GeneratorTM (see Appendix A, Figure A1). This newsfeed featured four status updates of connec-
tions, these are, ‘friends‘. Two status updates contained appeals to petitions, these were target 
stimuli, whereas the other two status updates contained two neutral status updates, which were 
fillers. Fillers were chosen to enhance face validity. Thematically, one target stimulus was con-
cerned with the suggestion of an influential CEO to privatise water, whereas the other target 
stimulus dealt with the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and its consequences. The 
fillers thematised flowers and holidays (for translations of Appendix A into English, see Table 
A1). All four chosen status updates had previously been pilot-tested by a convenience sample (N 
= 10; MAge = 25.9, SD = 1.73). Herein, it was assessed in how far the petition appeals capture 
people’s interest, and to what extent people would act on the appeals by sharing and signing the 
petitions. The two out of eight most reaction provoking target stimuli were chosen. Neutral stim-
uli had been tested for their political neutrality, and the two out of eight most neutral fillers were 
chosen. One target and one filler were modified to look like they were posted by females, the 
other target and filler seemingly were posted by males. That way gender was balanced out 
throughout stimuli. All status updates were integrated into a general layout of the newsfeed, that 
is, of what an exemplary Facebook user may see on her personal newsfeed page. Then, this news-
feed was refined into two versions to create a manipulation, that is, one low social support condi-
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tion, and one high social support condition. In the low social support version, each of the two tar-
get stimuli was seemingly shared by only one other person, respectively. In the high social sup-
port version, it appeared that 20 people had shared each target stimuli. Participants were exposed 
to either version of the newsfeed, and rated whether they would sign the petitions and share them 
on their profiles. Signing and sharing were both measured on continuous scales (0 = no and 100 = 
yes). These answers were summarised to the outcome variable online activism, which exhibited 
good internal reliability (Cronbach’s α = .72) for four items.  
 Rejection sensitivity was measured with a German translation of the shortened Rejection          
Sensitivity Questionnaire (A-RSQ; Downey & Feldman, 1996). This instrument comprises nine 
scenarios, which each are followed by two items on 6-point scales, for instance: “You ask your 
parents or another family member for a loan to help you through a difficult financial time. A. 
How concerned or anxious would you be over whether or not your family would  want to help 
you?“ (1 = very unconcerned and 6 = very concerned) and ‘’B. I would expect that they would 
agree to help as much as they can“ (1 = very unlikely and 6 = very likely, reverse coded). The 18 
answers were recorded according to description, then a reliability analysis showed good reliabili-
ty of the RSQ-A (Cronbach’s α = .83). The need to belong was measured with a German transla-
tion of the Need to Belong Scale (NTBS; Leary at al., 2013). It consists of ten statements rated on 
5-point scales, for instance ”I need to feel that there are people I can turn to in times of need” (1 
= not at all and 5 = extremely). This scale, after it had been recoded according to description, 
was found to be of good internal reliability (Cronbach’s α = .78). General political engagement 
was assessed with a modified version of the inventory for political voice (Keeter, Zukin, An-
dolina, & Jenkins, 2002). It consisted of 11 items, and exhibited good internal reliability (Cron
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bach’s α = .73).  
Design  
 This experiment followed a between-subject design. A standard multiple linear regression          
was employed. The independent variables were the responses to the RSQ-A (continuous), and the 
responses to the NTBS (continuous). Participants were randomly assigned to either of the social 
support condition (low, high; categorical). This manipulation functioned as a low order term, as 
well as a moderator variable for both trait measures. The higher order terms of Rejection Sensi-
tivity x Social Support, and Need to Belong x Social Support were also assessed. The dependent 
variable was the willingness to engage in online activism (continuous). 
Procedure  
 Participation was voluntary, and participants could abort the survey at any given moment.          
They were informed that no harm was expected to occur to them by their participation, and that 
their responses were recorded confidentially. Also their were ensured that their data was analysed 
and presented anonymously. Participation was expected to be emotionally and physically harm-
less and ethically sound. Participants first filled out the RSQ-A and the NTBS. In the following, 
participants saw one of the two Facebook newsfeeds. They were instructed to assume that this 
newsfeed were their own, and that the presented posts including subsequent reactions to the wall 
posts were reactions of their Facebook friends. Participants subsequently rated on a 101-point 
scale whether they would share and sign the petitions (0 = very unlikely, and 100 = very likely). 
They filled out their demographic data, and the questionnaire about their political voice. Lastly, 
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they were thanked for their participation.  
Results 
 The analyses focussed on the influences of social support, rejection sensitivity, and need to          
belong on online activism. The manipulation social support was taken into account as a predictor 
per se, as well as a moderator of rejection sensitivity and need to belong. Throughout the analy-
ses, the statistically significant p-value equals the common cut-off value of p = .05, and tenden-
cies are flagged to a cut-off p-values of up to p = .1.  
Preliminary Data Analyses 
 The data was collected during a one-and-a-half month period. One hundred participants          
started the survey. Data of participants who aborted the survey in progress (n = 24) were dis-
missed, because if participants dropped out in this study, they did so in the very beginning of it. 
For those drop outs that stated their gender and age (n = 20), a data comparison in form of a t-test 
between sample participants and dropouts who stated their gender (N = 96: n1 = 76, n2 = 20, re-
spectively) revealed a bias towards male participant dropout t(34.20) = - 2.26, p = .024, ∂ = - 
0.47, 95% CI [ -0.51, - 0.04]. No duplicate cases were detected in the remaining data set, and no 
data was sporadically missing of those who had followed the survey to the end. Variables were 
summarised according to descriptions. Further, one univariate outlier was deleted (DV-score: z = 
4.78, p  ≤  .001), because seemingly, this participant answered following a visual pattern. No 
multivariate outlier was detected using Mahalanobis' distance. The final data set included 75 cas-
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es.  
 The two groups are based on randomised group membership in social support, that is a low          
social support condition (n = 34; dummy coded: 0), and a high social support condition (n = 41). 
Both groups generally did not differ in distribution of demographics (see Appendix B, Table B1). 
Assumptions for univariate linear models held. 
 In order to check the quality of the dependent variable, that is whether participants consid         -
ered online activity to be protest behaviour, online activity was correlated against general politi-
cal participation. It was found that general political participation was moderately predictive of 
online activism (r = .42, p < .001), which means that participants, who in general protest more, 
are more willing to engage in online activity, too.  
Main-Analysis  
 The continuous independent variables were centred to avoid statistically induced multi         -
collinearity, then a standard multiple regression was run (see Appendix C, Table C1; for variance 
and covariance matrices see Table C2, and C3 respectively). The lower-order terms, namely re-
jection sensitivity (low values = rejection insensitive), and need to belong (low values = low need 
to belong), the moderator variable social support (dummy coded, where 0 = low social support), 
and both 2-way interaction terms of Social Support x Rejection Sensitivity, and Social Support x 
Need to Belong conjointly entered the model in order to explain online activism (Appendix C, 
Table C1). Overall, the full model explained 5 percent of the total variance (R2adj = 0.50, F(5, 69) 
=  1.78, p = .129). 
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 In an attempt to replicate previous findings, the first hypothesis states that high social sup         -
port leads to more online activism, in comparison to low social support. The contribution of so-
cial support to the model is statistically significant (β = .24, p = .045), and it uniquely contributes 
5.38 percent (sr = .23, p = .045) to the variance in the model. Thus, social support had a positive 
influence on online activity. 
 The second hypothesis is concerned with the extension of previous findings, that is, that          
rejection sensitivity interacts positively if social support is high, and negatively if social support 
is low. In this model the interaction-term Rejection Sensitivity x Social Support is non-significant 
(β = -. 04, p = .812). This means that rejection sensitivity does not moderate social support in on-
line activism.  
 The third hypothesis introduces the need to belong to the studies of protest, and postulates          
that individuals with a high need to belong engage more in online activism, but only if social 
support is high; if social support is low, the reverse pattern applies. The outcome of the standard 
multiple regression revealed a tendency (β = - .28, p = .078). To gain insight into the direction of 
the tendency, a mean-split that divided need to belong in two groups (low/high need to belong) 
was performed, and a post hoc simple effect analysis  (ANOVA) was run. The simple effects are 4
visualised in the following graph (Graph 1). It was found that within the high social support con-
dition, individuals with a high need to belong engaged less in protest activity than individuals 
with a low need to belong (p = .013; partial eta squared = 0.83). The hypothesised reverse effect, 
that is, that low social support in combination with a high need to belong elects less willingness 
to engage in online activism could not be supported by the data. Within the low social support 
 In this ANOVA computation, only the two lower order terms (social support, need to belong, 4
and the 2-way interaction) could be kept due to computational restraints. 
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group, participants with low and high need to belong did not significantly differ in intention to 
online activism (p = .910, partial eta squared ≤ .001). 
Graph 1 
Interaction of Low and High Social Support Group and Low and High Need to Belong Group on 
Online Activism 
 
Discussion 
 This experiment investigated social influences in moderation of personality traits in online          
activism. In the following, the results are interpreted and contextualised. The outcome partially 
supports the hypotheses.  
Social Influences Enhance Online Activism 
 The first hypothesis stated that if social support for online protest is high, individuals are          
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more willing to engage in online activism than if social support is low. This hypothesis is corrob-
orated, as more online activism was observed given high social support than given little social 
support. Hereby, the findings for offline protest (Bäck et al., 2011) could be replicated for online 
engagement. Also, this finding can be integrated into the extended selective incentive model that 
postulates that selective incentives, and social influences can motivate protest.  
 The original selective incentives model suggests that the variable social support expresses           
social norm towards the potential protester or entertainment value. The finding may be interpret-
ed as pressure of the in-group that fostered the individual’s compliance. In terminology of the 
equation previously introduced, selective incentives are integrated into a rational choice model, 
namely 
  U = P x B – C + D          
where D is the reward that protesters gain by participation in protest itself. The compliance to so-
cial norm secures the individual as part of the group (Olsen, 1965). Social norm may have influ-
enced the decision to online activism: Nolan et al. (2008) found that social norm  had the highest 5
success rate in an experiment on persuasive communication concerning energy conservation. 
Moreover, the effect may be based on entertainment value (Tullock, 1971), that is, in this case, 
users enjoy digital affiliation with others. Protesters communicate to their circles that they have 
taken part in a movement, because this information is publicised to the users network if the user 
signs the petition or shares it.  
 Concerning the extended selective incentive model, the observed effect may express infor         -
mational normative influence, which implies that the appeals have become more trustworthy as 
 or as they coined it “social normative influence“ 5
Running head: SOCIAL INFLUENCES IN ONLINE PROTEST                                              !21
more people have signalled support for those causes already. In terms of the rational-choice equa-
tion this pathway lowers C, the cost term of protest. Additionally, high social support may reflect 
a promising amount of supporters, which heightens P the likelihood that the contribution of one 
individual makes the protest successful.  
 It may be that either of those social influences is enhanced in comparison to conventional          
protest by so called ’masspersonal' communication. This type of communication is technically 
supported by several SNSs, and enables each sender to simultaneously interact with individual 
users, a closed network, as well as the broader public (O’Sullivan, 2005). Through this way of 
communication, social capital, which describes resources provided by a network of meaningful 
others, including weak connections, as in acquaintanceship, and strong ties as in friend- and rela-
tionships (Bourdieu, 1985) is fostered (Hampton et al., 2011). In accordance to this, Ellison et al. 
(2011) found that social capital on Facebook fostered instrumental as well as social support on-
line, but also in the offline world. In the current experiment, the amount of social support was 
manipulated, and it was shown that online social support activated people to partake in online 
protest. It is hereby suggested that enhanced connectedness and display of social support may 
lead to more online activism, which is in line with the findings of Rainie et al. (2012): in their 
extensive research they found a strong, positive, yet correlational relationship between Facebook 
use and political activity. Moreover, online protest and mobilisation especially spread through 
strong ties as supported by a network analysis on social contagion of a protest movement. In the 
beginning of the movement, the leaders of the recruitment are in atypical topological positions, 
that means that they are situated in the periphery of a network, which can be interpreted as weak 
ties. The movement gained moment through so called spreaders, those who were centrally located 
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in the network. Spreaders can be interpreted as closer ties to the target network, given the as-
sumption that a higher amount of connections between ’nodes’, or users, of a network equals a 
closer connectedness between two nodes (Gonzalez-Bailon, Borge-Holthoefer, Rivero, & 
Moreno, 2011). Research supported that weak social ties are politically influential, but close 
friends rather than acquaintances were the most influential in offline voter turnout (Bond et al., 
2012). 
 Furthermore, the effect of social support on willingness to partake in online activism may          
be supported by informational social influence, where information of social connections is treated 
as evidence about reality, because information processing is guided by cognitive heuristics in 
credibility evaluation (Metzger & Flanagin, 2013). This implies that more online activism may 
not only be triggered by normative social influence, as proposed by the social incentives model 
(Bäck et al., 2013), but also by informational social influence. For example, politically inactive 
users received food of thought by their circles (Kaye, 2011), which has been found not only to 
increase the amount of followers of a movement, but also to diversify the social spectrum of ac-
tivists in offline social movements (Schwarz, 2011). 
Interpersonal Differences in Susceptibility to Social Support  
 Next, it is presumed that individuals are, to an interpersonally varying degree, susceptible          
to social influences towards online activism. Therefore, the second and third hypotheses focussed 
on the interplay between rejection sensitivity and social support, and the need to belong and so-
cial support, respectively, as well as the effects of these interplays in online activism.  
 In extension to previous findings (Bäck et al., 2013), it was postulated that rejection sensi         -
Running head: SOCIAL INFLUENCES IN ONLINE PROTEST                                              !23
tive individuals engage more in protest if social support was high, whereas the opposite pattern is 
expected if their network does not support protest activity. This hypothesis could not be support-
ed by the findings, namely, in this experiment, rejection sensitivity, moderated by the extent of 
social support, did not exhibit an influence on protest activity. These findings can mean that the 
influence of rejection sensitivity observed in offline protest (Bäck et al., 2013) may not carry over 
into the online sphere, or that the petition appeals might not have been perceived as appeals to a 
social norm, but as informational social influence, which, to the knowledge of the author, has not 
been found to stand in moderating relationship with rejection sensitivity.  
 Another possibility for the non-support of this hypothesis can be low power, based on the          
relatively subtle social support manipulation as well as low participation rates, as later discussed 
in the section on shortcomings (see Shortcomings). Bäck (2014) found that the trait of rejection 
sensitivity determined protest engagement, especially under the circumstance that potential pro-
testers had previously been rejected. She found that highly rejection sensitive, angered individu-
als protested most against the introduction of tuition fees in Sweden, in comparison to rejected 
but rejection insensitive individuals, and in comparison to non-rejected, rejection sensitive indi-
viduals. If the trait of rejection sensitivity in relation to online activism by means of social norm 
or group belongingness should be explored again, it is suggested to trigger rejection sensitivity in 
rejection sensitive individuals.  
 Lastly, the need to belong is introduced to the study of online protest behaviour. The third          
hypothesis postulates that individuals with a high need to belong are influenced by social support, 
namely, they are more susceptible to engage in protest activity under high social support and 
comply to it in the form of protest, but they are less inclined to engage if little social support is 
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signalised. Interestingly, the results exhibit a pattern contrary to this hypothesis, namely, the re-
sults suggest that in tendency high social support has a positive effect on protest engagement on 
people with low need to belong, rather than a high need to belong. In fact, low need to belong led 
to a significantly higher willingness to SNS protest. Possibly, individuals high in the need to be-
long did not perceive the high social support condition as solid social support, and were not en-
couraged to protest, whereas the effect for individuals with low need to belong under high social 
support might express a instrumental motivation, namely high social support for a petitions can 
indicate that these petitions are gaining momentum, so supporting these petitions may underlie 
utilitarian considerations of the extended collective incentives model, that is that P, the change 
into a successful outcome that one individual can make, rises.  
Limitations  
 The experiment yielded a very small main-effect the influence of social support in compari         -
son to previous effects found on conventional activism, and the concept of social support may 
cover several social influences at ones. Arguably, the small effect sizes might be grounded in 
shortcoming within this experiment. First, a broad population was addressed, as potentially every 
German speaking Facebook user could access the study and partake. I think this openness 
strengthened the generalisability of the results, but at the same time, it did compromise a lower 
effect size based on this more diverse sample: the pilot sample had been more homogeneous in 
age, in terms of a homogeneously high educational level, and in political orientation compared to 
the sample of the main experiment. While the pilot sample indicated high engagement in pro-
posed online petitions, the general sample was relatively disengaged. Generally, younger individ-
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uals are more involved in social media and SNSs. Likewise, they participate more in online ac-
tivism (Rainie et al., 2012; Statistisches Bundesamt, 2013). Even though a shift towards broader 
and more diverse base of SNSs users has been emerging, it may be argued, that online activism is 
still less attractive for older than younger individuals. Moreover, the survey topic was not dis-
guised, but directly stated its purpose–the study of online activism. It may be hereby a bias was 
created towards politically and civically active participants, who may be less driven by social in-
fluences than the average protestor. There should have been a way to access the actual attitudes 
towards the two petition appeals, these are a petition against the TTIP and one petition against the 
request at the World Water Forum to privatise water without disguising the amount of social sup-
port. Unfortunately, these measures have not been taken in during the data collection. Also, the 
manipulation of social support may have carried an ambiguous concept. It may have represented 
social norm more clearly if instead of 20 shares, it had been shared by even a greater number of 
network connections.  
Future Research 
 For future studies on online engagement, it should also be investigated how different kinds          
of online protest behaviours may be motivated by various social influences. In this experiment, 
the willingness to participate, instead of actual engagement was accessed because of time con-
straints. It was reasoned that, in accordance with theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1985), in-
tentions to politically engage predict actual protest behaviour, and intentions are better indicators 
for behaviour than attitudes (LaPiere, 1934). Future research however, could follow the distribu-
tion of the actual protest behaviours, and analyse motivations behind online protest engagement, 
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maybe in form of a software in combination with big data analysis. Doing so would decisively 
raise validity. In congruence with the self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & 
Wetherell, 1987), social identity could be made silent, to elect even more compliant behaviours.  
 Moreover, it will be interesting to further explore social motivations on online political ac         -
tion, as has been noted that “motivations for political engagement on social media may vary by 
activity“ (Macafee, 2013, p. 2766), for instance, posting news stories was motivated predomi-
nantly by informational factors, and was posted to provoke discussion, whereas sharing links was 
predominantly associated with social and presentational needs of the social media users 
(Macafee, 2013).  
               
Conclusion 
 Conclusively, the Internet facilitates the distribution of political information, and SNSs in          
particular offer diverse standpoints and social influence. Not only are some online political cam-
paigns claimed successful (Penney, 2014), but online political engagement and online activism 
motivate offline civil engagement. As more is known about the mechanisms of online activism, 
more political engagement can be promoted. The fortitude of social influences online protest in 
comparison to various conventional protest is yet to be determined. It is proposed that the forti-
tude of one written message on an SNS may be of less intense than a face-to face encounter with 
a politically active entity, but the ubiquity of these messages may make the change towards a 
more politically and civically engaged society.  
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Appendix A 
Figure A1  
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Appendix A (continued) 
  Table A1 
   
Translation of target stimuli and fillers (see Figure A1)
Post by 
person:
gender 
(female / 
male)
filler / 
target English translation
Maria 
Neudorfer
female filler My new Livingstone daisies
Leon  
Klein
male target Impede TTIP! 
www.umweltinstitut.org 
The EU and USA are have been 
negotiating the TTIP (Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership). The 
consequences of this agreement would be 
negative in many ways
Matthias 
Seiler
male Filler Best weather for a getway @ Hochzeiger 
- Pitztal
Denise 
Grunwald 
female Target “The opinion I think is extreme, is that as 
a human you should have a right to 
water“  
act.storyofstuff.org 
Nestlé backed up that statement with this 
ruthless move at the World Water Forum. 
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Appendix B 
Table B1
Descriptive Statistics and Comparison of Demographics by Manipulation Condition Social 
Support 
Variable Condition 
1 (n = 34) 2 (n = 41) F (1, 73) p 
Social Support low high - -
Mean Age (SD) 29.35 (8.92) 28.10 (8.17) 1.51 .531
Gender (Female / Male) 20 / 14 22 / 19 - -
Mean RSQ-A (SD) 8.10 (3.56) 9.43 (3.74) .00 .123
Mean NB (SD) 3.07 (.70) 3.24 (.58) .68 .269
Mean OA (SD) 30.73 (23.02) 40.84 (26.07) .57 .082
Mean ACT (SD) 1.26 (.21) 1.27 (.27) 1.84 .792
Note. RSQ-A = rejection sensitivity; NB = need to belong; OA = online activism; ACT = general political 
engagement 
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Appendix C
Table C1
Standard Multiple Regression Explains the Variance of Online Activism 
Correlations
Variables Model B p
95 %  
Confidence Interval
Zero-
order
Partial Semi- 
partial
Constant 30.35 .001 [21.78, 38.91]
Social Support 11.84     .045** [ 0.29, 23.39]   .20   .24   .23
Rejection Sensitivity  - .87 .488 [ -3.37,  1.63] - .09 - .08 - .08
Need to Belong  2.67 .675 [-9.99, 15.34] - .13   .05  .05
Social Support x 
Rejection Sensitivity    .39 .812 [ -2.89, 3.67] - .09   .03   .03
Social Support  x 
Need to Belong
-16.62 .078* [-35.17, 1.92] - .23 - .21 - .20
Note: n = 75, ** stat. sign p ≤ 0.05, * tendency p ≤ 0.1,
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Appendix C (continued) 
Table C2 
Correlations & Covariances of Standard Multiple Linear Regression  
with Values for SS, RS, NB, 2-way Interaction RS x SS, and NB x SS
Correlations SS RS NB
2-way 
Interaction 
RS x SS
2-way 
Interaction 
NB x SS
SS
RS - .13
NB - .05 - .30
2-way Interaction 
RS x SS   .04 -. 76 .23
2-way Interaction 
NB x SS - .01    .21 - .68 - .27
Covariances SS RS NB
2-way 
Interaction 
RS x SS
2-way 
Interaction 
NB x SS
SS 33.52 - .92 - 1.92  .37 - .50
RS - .92 1.57 - 2.40 - 1.57 2.40
NB - 1.92 - 2.40   40.32 2.40 - 40.32
2-way Interaction 
RS x SS  .37 - 1.57   2.40   2.70 - 4.14
2-way Interaction 
NB x SS - .50 2.40 - 40.32 - 4.14   86.40
Note. SS = Social Support, RS = rejection sensitivity, NB = need to belong
